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NOTES AND COMMENTS
CASTING A CONSTITUTIONAL
CONTROVERSY AS A
NONJUSTICIABLE POLITICAL
QUESTION: MADE IN THE USA
FOUNDATION v. UNITED STATES
I. INTRODUCTION

On February 27, 2001, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit held that the determination of whether an international
trade agreement constitutes a "treaty" within the meaning of
the Treaty Clause of Article II of the Constitution presents a
nonjusticiable political question.' Because the constraints of
the political question doctrine preclude the court from deciding
at which point an international agreement rises to the level of
a treaty, it lacks the jurisdiction to reach the merits on the
question of whether the North America Free Trade Agreement
("NAFTA" or "Agreement")2 required Senate ratification pursuant to the Treaty Clause.3 The circuit court's decision reversed
the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Alabama, which held that the issue of whether NAFTA is a
treaty is not a political question and is therefore subject to judicial review.4 In so deciding, the district court proceeded to
rule on the merits, holding that Congress' power to adopt
1. Made in the USA Found. v. United States, 242 F.3d 1300, 1319 (11th
Cir. 2001), cert. denied sub nom., United Steelworkers of America v. United
States, 122 S. Ct. 613 (2001) [hereinafter Made in the USA II].
2. See North America Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, Pub.
L. No. 103-182, 107 Stat. 2057 (1993) (codified at 19 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3473
(1994)) [hereinafter NAFTA Implementation Act].
3. Made in the USA II, 242 F.3d at 1300.
4. Made in the USA Found. v. United States, 56 F. Supp. 2d 1226, 1275
(N.D. Ala. 1999), rev'd, 242 F.3d 1300 (11th Cir. 2001), cert. denied sub nom.,
United Steelworkers of America v. United States, 122 S. Ct. 613 (2001) [hereinafter Made in the USA I].
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NAFTA derives from its powers under the Foreign Commerce
Clause and that the scope of such power is plenary.5 Thus, because the Foreign Commerce powers are unlimited, they cannot be constraint by the requirements of the Treaty Clause.6
Consequently, the Agreement's adoption was constitutional,
notwithstanding Congress' failure to adhere to the treaty ratification procedure as outlined in the Treaty Clause.7
In concluding that the issue presents a political question and
is therefore nonjusticiable, the circuit court pointed to two aspects of the controversy that lend support to its political, and
therefore nonjusticiable, character. First, as an international
agreement, the parties and relationships involved are foreign
entities and foreign policy matters, and in the area of foreign
affairs, the judiciary has traditionally practiced great restraint
vis-A-vis the political branches! Second, because the substantive matter of the Agreement involves commercial activity, as
opposed to, say, military affairs, Congress' power under the
Foreign Commerce Clause is plenary and therefore unreviewable by the courts.9 Consequently, the court reasoned, as a
commercial, international agreement, the constitutionality of
the means utilized to adopt NAFTA cannot be subject to judicial review. °
Tellingly, then, the circuit court's reasoning leading to its refusal to consider the merits of the controversy is strikingly
analogous to the district court's reasoning on the merits. While
the latter court relied on the Executive's foreign affairs prerogative" and Congress' Foreign Commerce Clause power 2 to
5. Id. at 1319-20.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 1323.
8. See Made in the USA II, 242 F.3d at 1311-12 (judicial nonintervention
is confirmed by historical practice and Supreme Court precedent); id. at 1312
n.27 (pointing to history which informs the inquiry into the political branches
foreign affairs power); id. at 1313 (the conduct of foreign relations is committed to political branches and is not subject to judicial inquiry).
9. See id. at 1314 ("[W]ith respect to commercial agreements, we find...
the Constitution's clear assignment of authority to the political branches.").
10. Id. (arguing that courts overseeing the President and Congress in this
matter is intrusive).
11. Made in the USA I, 56 F. Supp. 2d at 1322 ("[Tlhe President... was
acting pursuant to his constitutional responsibility for conducting the Nation's foreign affairs."). For authorities cited in support of the generally ac-
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support its holding that NAFTA was adopted in a constitutional manner," despite the failure to adhere to the Treaty
Clause's requirements, the former court relied on the same
prerogative and the same power to hold that the issue at controversy is solely within the realm of the political branches. 4
Consequently, the political branches' dominion over such matters is so absolute that it precludes the judiciary from deciding
the constitutionality of the means chosen for the Agreement's
adoption. 5
Given the diametrically opposite conclusions
reached on the political, and hence nonjusticiable, nature of the
questions considered, and in light of the parallels in the reasoning employed by the courts in reaching such disparate conclusions, the amorphous nature of the political question doctrine
becomes apparent.'6 Thus viewed, these holdings provide fuel
for stoking the recurrent debate' 7 as to the legitimacy, function
and scope of the exceptions to judicial review in a democratic
society, 8 particularly with respect to foreign affairs.' 9
cepted view that matters of foreign policy are particularly the province and
responsibility of the President, see id. at 1322 n.351; Dep't of Navy v. Egan,
484 U.S. 518, 529 (1988); Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 293-94 (1981).
12. Made in the USA 1, 56 F. Supp. 2d at 1320 (arguing that Congressional power under the Foreign Commerce Clause, particularly when the
agreement is dominated by foreign commerce provisions, is at least concurrent with the Treaty Clause power).
13. Id. at 1323.
14. Made in the USA II, 242 F.3d at 1313-14.

15. Id.
16. See Robert F. Nagel, PoliticalLaw, Legalistic Politics: A Recent History of the Political Question Doctrine, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 643, 668 (1989)
(arguing that the political question doctrine is incomprehensible because all
constitutional issues have broad political aspects and that the function of the
judiciary in constitutional cases is political education).
17. See Anne-Marie Slaughter Burley, Are ForeignAffairs Different? 106
HARv. L. REV. 1980 (1993) (describing the debate over the political question
doctrine as a scholarly perennial that reflects a fundamental contest over the
legitimacy and scope ofjudicial review in a democratic society).
18. See J. Peter Mulhern, In Defense of the Political Question Doctrine,
137 U. PA. L. REV. 97, 108-09 (1988) (explaining that the debate over the
political question doctrine grew out of the scholarly arguments about the
proper role ofjudicial review in our constitutional order).
19. See THOMAS M. FRANiCK, POLITICAL QUEsTIoNs/JuDIciAL ANSWERS:
DOES THE RULE OF LAW APPLY TO FOREIGN AFFAIRS? (1992) (attacking the per-

ception that foreign affairs are "different" and therefore deserving immunity
from judicial review).
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Specifically, this Comment argues that a correct application
of the political question doctrine should not bar judicial review
of the issue of whether NAFTA, or any international agreement, is a treaty and whether the Treaty Clause's procedure is
the exclusive means for adopting such a treaty. Both the district court as well as the circuit court applied the political question framework enunciated in Baker v. Carr20 in reaching its
respective decision on the political character of the issue pre2
2
sented, and its corollary justiciability and nonjusticiability.
However, the district court's analysis is the more tenable one,
whereas the circuit court's is flawed. Part II of this Comment
provides the historical background of NAFTA's adoption and
presents the issues litigated. Part III examines the circuit
court's Baker analysis and critiques its approach with respect
to each of the Baker factors. Part IV considers the justifications underlying the foreign affairs branch of the political question doctrine, in general, and further inquires whether commercial areas of foreign affairs, in particular, warrant more or
less insulation from review by the judicial branch. Finally,
Part V concludes that the political question exception to judicial review is irrelevant with respect to this controversy. As a
result, the circuit court should have ruled on the merits of the
issue of whether NAFTA is a treaty, and if so, whether the twothirds-of-the-Senate requirement in accordance with the Treaty
Clause is the sole means of ratifying a treaty.
II.BACKGROUND

A. NAFTA's Legislative History and Adoption
In 1993, Congress passed legislation approving and implementing the free trade Agreement between the United States,
Mexico and Canada.2 3 The three countries of North America
initiated negotiations in 1990 with the intention of forming an
ambitious economic alliance encompassing the entire conti-

20. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
21. Made in the USA I, 56 F. Supp. 2d 1226, 1254-63 (N.D. Ala. 1999).
22. Made in the USA II, 242 F.3d 1300, 1312-18 (11th Cir. 2001).
23. H.R. REP. No. 103-361(I), at 8 (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2552, 2552.
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nent.' The Agreement would accomplish this goal by creating
a "free trade zone" through the elimination of tariffs and other
trade barriers between the signatories.2 The culmination of
two years of negotiations occurred on December 17, 1992, when
the leaders of the three countries signed NAFTA. However, an
intense political debate over the wisdom of entering into the
Agreement ensued and lasted for almost a year, until December 8, 1993, when Congress enacted the North America Free
Trade Agreement Implementation Act ("Act").
In spite of its label, i.e., the North America Free Trade
Agreement Implementation Act," the legislation served a dual
purpose. In addition to its indicated purpose - i.e., providing
a series of laws to implement the provisions of the Agreement
within the United States - the legislation also served as the
legislative approval2 of the Agreement - i.e., the enactment of
the Agreement as binding law of the land.29 This latter purpose
is what lies at the heart of the controversy challenging the con24. See id. at 2558 (NAFTA is "the most comprehensive trade agreement
ever negotiated.").
25. Made in the USA I, 56 F. Supp. 2d at 1228.
26. NAFTA Implementation Act, 19 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3473 (1994).
27. Pub. L. No. 103-182, 107 Stat. 2057 (1993).
28. The North America Free Trade Agreement was adopted pursuant to
the "fast track" procedure for adopting international agreements. The provisions authorizing the use of the "fast track" were included in Trade Act of
1974, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2495 (1994 & 2001 Supp.) See also Harold Hongju
Koh, The Fast Track and United States Trade Policy, 18 BRoOK. J. INT'L L.
143 (1992). The fast track procedure permits:
[T]he President to initiate a foreign affairs action, (for example, negotiation of an international trade agreement), but requires him to
notify, consult, and subsequently submit the product of that action
back to Congress for final, accelerated approval. Under modified
House and Senate rules, Congress "promises" the President that it
will automatically discharge the completed initiative from committee
within a certain number of days, bar floor amendment of the submitted proposal, and limit floor debate, thereby ensuring the President
and our trading partners that the submitted legislative package will
be voted up or down without alteration within a fixed period of time.
Id. at 143-44. Moreover, the President's purported power to negotiated and
concluded NAFTA was pursuant to his constitutional responsibility for conducting foreign affairs of the United States and in accordance with the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2901-2906 (1994).
29. See Made in the USA I, 56 F. Supp. 2d at 1228; NAFTA Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 103-182, 107 Stat. 2057 (1993).
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stitutionality of the Agreement, namely, that the majority with
which the Act passed was a mere vote of 234 to 200 in the
House of Representative and sixty-one to thirty-eight in the
Senate.30 It thus did not comply with the Treaty Clause,31
which mandates an approval by a majority of at lease twothirds of the Senate in order to ratify a treaty.
While the Act necessarily terminated the political debate
over the wisdom of the Agreement, the overall struggle had by
no means ended. Rather, the vote merely altered the character
of the dispute and the fora in which it would take place, for the
point of contention now shifted from the political to the legal;
i.e., from congressional and presidential debates to the courts.
That is, NAFTA's foes, which had heretofore opposed it on policy grounds, claiming that the Agreement would cause the loss
of jobs32 and harm the environment,3 3 now transformed their
argument into a legal issue, claiming that the Agreement, as a
treaty, was unconstitutionally adopted because it failed to garner the requisite two-thirds majority of the Senate in contravention of the Treaty Clause.
B. JudicialTreatment and Case History
In 1998, a group of plaintiffs sued the government, seeking a
declaration that NAFTA was unconstitutional.3" One group of
plaintiffs, the so called "institutional plaintiffs," included Made
in the USA Foundation, Inc., a trade group devoted to promot30. See 139 CONG. REC. S16, 712-13; JAMES R. HOLBEIN & DONALD J.
MUSCH,
NAFTA: FINAL TEXT, SUMMARY,
IMPLEMENTATION DIRECTORY 1-4 (1994).

LEGISLATIvE

HISTORY

&

31. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
32. See, e.g., 139 CONG. REC. S16, 602-02 (1993) (statement of Sen. Metzenbaum) ('NAFTA guarantees the further exploitation of Mexican workers
at the expense of American jobs.").
33. See, e.g., Editorial, The "GreatDebate" over NAFTA, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
9, 1993, at A16; The 1993 Campaign; Transcript of 3d TV Debate Between
Bush, Clinton and Perot, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20, 1992, at A20 (At the debate, H.
Ross Perot stated: "You implement that Nafta, the Mexican trade agreement,
where they pay people $1 and hour, have no health care, no retirement, no
pollution controls, etc., etc., etc., and you're going to hear a giant sucking
sound ofjobs being pulled out of this country right at the time when we need
the tax base to pay the debt, and pay down the interest on the debt and get
our house back in order.") (emphasis added).
34. See Made in the USA I, 56 F. Supp. 2d at 1229.
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ing American-made goods; the United Steelworkers of America;
and Local 12L United Steel Workers - the latter are two labor
unions representing American workers.35 These plaintiffs contended that the government's failure to abide by the Treaty
Clause, which requires the "Advice and Consent" of "two thirds
of the Senators present" before a treaty can be ratified, 6 renders NAFTA unconstitutional.
The government countered by arguing, first, that the court
lacked jurisdiction to determine the constitutionality of NAFTA
-because: (1) the plaintiffs have no standing to bring the suit;
and (2) the plaintiffs alleged claims present a political question, which is barred from judicial review by the constraints of
the political question doctrine.38 The government's second argument was an argument on the merits: it claimed that
NAFTA was constitutionally adopted notwithstanding the procedure for treaty ratification that is outlined in the Treaty
Clause.3 9
35. See id. Another group, the so-called "voter plaintiffs," consisted of
those plaintiffs who brought suit in their individual capacities, claiming that
the failure to comply with the Treaty Clause procedures had diluted their
Senators' votes, but the court dismissed these claims due to their lack of
standing, finding that their claim is nothing more than a generalized grievance. See id. at 1235-36. However, the court found that the institutional
plaintiffs did have the requisite standing because they alleged injuries - loss
of bargaining power and loss of membership - that were "fairly traceable to
NAFTA" and because such injuries would likely "be redressed by a favorable
decision." Id. at 1253.

36. U.S. CoNsT. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
37. Made in the USA I, 56 F. Supp. 2d at 1229.
38. Id.
39. Id. The government's primary argument on the merits was that the
procedure outlined in the Treaty Clause for ratifying treaties is not "exclusive
as to all international agreements." Id. at 1317. Consequently, as there are
other provisions in the Constitution, such as the Foreign Commerce Clause,
that might provide the source of the power to adopt such agreements, NAFTA
would be constitutional regardless of the Treaty Clause's mandate. See id.
Arguably, the government's argument on the merits was in the alternative,
for, in addition to its argument against the exclusivity of the Treaty Clause
- should the Agreement be ruled a treaty within the meaning of Article IIthe government also disputed the plaintiffs' claim that NAFTA is necessarily
a Treaty. In this respect, the government's attack was on the plaintiffs test
used to determine whether the agreement is a treaty. However, this position
is somewhat murky because, by denying the exclusivity of the Treaty Clause,
the government seemed to agree that a vote by two thirds of the Senate alone
- i.e., the Treaty Clause procedure - would have been an alternative option
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1. The District Court's Decision
In a lengthy and remarkably thorough opinion," the district
court found that the institutional plaintiffs had standing4 ' and
that a review of the issues presented was not barred by the political question doctrine.42 Thus, the court decided to review the
merits of the case. On the merits, however, the court granted
the government's request for summary judgment in holding
that the Treaty Clause was not the exclusive manner under
which a treaty may be adopted.43 Consequently, since the
adoption of the Agreement was a valid exercise of Congress'
Foreign Commerce power," and because such power is plenary," NAFTA was enacted constitutionally, in spite of the
failure to satisfy the Treaty Clause requirements. 6
to ratify NAFTA, thus effectively agreeing that NAFTA is a treaty as contemplated by Article II. Nevertheless, the court seemed unfazed by this inconsistency by pointing out that since the exclusivity issue will be the decisive factor in determining the constitutionality of NAFTA, the issue of
whether it is a treaty in the first place is unimportant when standing alone.
See id.
40. See Recent Case, District Court Holds that NAFTA is a Valid Exercise
of Foreign Commerce Power, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1234, 1235 n.9 (2000) (district
court's ninety-eight-page opinion substantially incorporates the arguments of
both parties to provide a detailed record for reviewing courts); Made in the
USA I, 56 F. Supp. 2d at 1229 (court lacks finality and any decision will be
ephemeral).
41. Made in the USA I, 56 F. Supp. 2d at 1253 (The institutional plaintiffs
alleged injuries - loss of membership and bargaining power - were "fairly
traceable to NAFTA" and "there is substantial likelihood that their injuries
would be redressed by a favorable decision.").
42. Id. at 1276.
43. Id. at 1317. The district court's ruling on the exclusiveness of the
Treaty Clause was harshly criticized as being "in direct contravention of the
text of the Constitution, the intent of the framers, and federal court precedent, all three of which collectively prove the exclusivity of the Treaty
Clause." Rachel S. Brass, Note, Made in the USA Foundation v. United
States: NAFTA, the Treaty Clause, and ConstitutionalObsolescence, 9 MINN.
J. GLOBAL TRADE 663, 681 (2000). Similarly, the court was criticized for unjustifiably discounting "clear historical evidence that the Framers intended
the Treaty Clause to be the exclusive means of ratifying treaties." District
Court Holds thatNAFTA is a Valid Exercise, supranote 40, at 1236.
44. Made in the USA I, 56 F. Supp. 2d at 1319-20.
45. Id. at 1317.
46. The court drew a distinction between the Treaty Clause's ambiguity
and the Foreign Commerce Clause's comparative clarity. Whereas there is no
explicit language making the Treaty Clause exclusive as to all international
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Generally, when analyzing the political nature of a question
before a court in order to determine whether the political question doctrine deprives it of jurisdiction, the court must necessarily take cognizance of the substantive issues of the controversy."' Thus, even though the justiciability inquiry occurs at
the preliminary phase of the litigation, there is usually a good
preview of the principal issues to follow.48 Indeed, the justiciability inquiry may inform the examination of the merits, and
vice versa. Consequently, where the court eventually reaches
the merits, it may thus appear that there is duplication of effort, as the same issues considered under the rubric of justiciability are reconsidered again when adjudicating on the merits.
In Made in the USA Foundation v. United States, the district
court acknowledged this distinct characteristic of the political
question doctrine analysis, and correctly termed it "a necessary
evil,"49 since the court cannot reach the merits until it is satisfied that it has the proper jurisdiction to do so.5"
The court also pointed out another unique quality of the political qudstion doctrine: namely, that as an important consequence of a finding of its applicability to given controversy, juagreements, the plenary scope of the (domestic and well as foreign) Commerce Clause is clear. The court also relied on Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9
Wheat.) 1 (1824), to argue that the Framers intended the foreign commerce
power to be broad. See Made in the USA I, 56 F. Supp. 2d at 1317.
47. See Made in the USA I, 56 F. Supp. 2d at 1255 n.106.
48. This is the result of applying the proper test under the Baker framework, as discussed at the text accompanying notes 60 and 127, infra. In fact,
it is precisely this feature of the political question doctrine that lead critics of
the doctrine to deny its very existence. For when the court must look to the
substantive arguments to decide whether to decide, it is effectively making a
decision based on the merits, the only difference is that the decision is made
at a preliminary stage under the guise of a jurisdictional - i.e., threshold issue. See Louise Henkin, Is there Really a "PoliticalQuestion" Doctrine?,85
YALE L.J. 597 (1976) (arguing that the purported application of the doctrine
to avoid adjudication is in reality an adjudication of the underlying constitutionality of the alleged act). The divergent conclusions of the district and
circuit courts with respect to the political question doctrine in the present
case, while both reaching the same substantive result as 'to the underlying
constitutionality of NAFTA's adoption, would certainly bolster Professor
Henkin's position.
49. Made in the USA I, 56 F. Supp. 2d at 1255.
50. Id. Furthermore, in the district court's exhaustive application of the
Baker analytical framework, this feature emerges quite apparently and helps
illuminate the central issues on the merits that are discussed latterly.
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dicial review will be barred absolutely.5 1 For example, the
other restrictions on judicial review emanating from the caseor-controversy requirement of Article III, such as standing,
ripeness and mootness, may be cured by altering the factual
circumstances, e.g., presenting the issue at a different point in
time, or by different plaintiffs." No such relief is possible, however, when a question is declared nonjusticiable due to its
political nature. In the latter case, therefore, the foreclosure of
judicial scrutiny is in absolute terms.53
The court then proceeded to outline the Baker v. Carrcriteria
for analyzing whether the controversy at bar presents a nonjusticiable political question.5 4 In Baker, the Supreme Court
itemized the oft-quoted six-factor analytical framework that
courts should apply in determining whether a case is nonjusticiable:
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found [1] a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or [21 a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or [3] the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly
for nonjudicial discretion; or [41 the impossibility of a court's
undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack
of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or [51
an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political
decision already made; or [6] the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question. 55
This six-factor framework was subsequently condensed into a
three-part inquiry in Goldwater v. Carter, as follows: "(i) Does
the issue involve resolution of questions committed by the text
of the Constitution to a coordinate branch of government? (ii)
Would resolution of the question demand that a court move
beyond areas of judicial expertise? (iii) Do prudential consid-

51. Id. at 1254.
52. See id.
53. Id. (quoting 1

RONALD

D.

ROTUNDA & JOHN

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 2.16 (2d ed. 1992)).

54. Made in the USA I, 56 F. Supp. 2d at 1254.
55. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).

E. NowAK,

TREATISE ON
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erations counsel against judicial intervention?" 6 Because the
parties in Made in the USA Foundationused this streamlined
version of the political question analysis,57 and because the
shorter version incorporates all the Baker criteria without
abridging them,58 both the district court as well as the circuit
court employed the three Goldwater inquiries in analyzing the
political question issue in the present case.59
a. Textual Commitment
The government's primary argument on the textual commitment prong was that the text of the Constitution conferred on
the President and Congress vast powers in the areas of foreign
affairs and foreign commerce.6 ° The government thus pointed
to the various textually enumerated powers of the President in
the area of foreign affairs, such as his role as Chief Executive,61
and Commander in Chief." Furthermore, the President has
the power to "make Treaties" with the consent of two-thirds of
the Senate present,0 to "appoint Ambassadors and Consuls'

and to receive ambassadors and other public ministers.6 5 Simi-

larly, Congress' textually enumerated powers in the realm of
foreign affairs include the power to declare war,66 the power to
regulate commerce with foreign nations,"' as well as the Senate's role in, the treaty-making process under the Treaty
Clause. 8
Because the grants of these powers to the President and
Congress are textually self-evident and therefore indisputable,
the parties' contentions must essentially center on the scope of
these powers; i.e., whether such powers are subject to any con56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 998 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring).
Made in the USA I, 56 F. Supp. 2d at 1255.
Made in the USA II, 242 F.3d 1300, 1312 (11th Cir. 2001).
See id.; Made in the USA I, 56 F. Supp. 2d at 1255.
Made in the USA 1, 56 F. Supp. 2d at 1255.

61.
62.
63.
64.

U.S. CoNsT. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
Id.

65.
66.
67.
68.
1255.

Id. art. II, § 3. See also Made in the USA I, 56 F. Supp. 2d at 1255.
U.S. CONST.art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
Id. art. II, § 2, ci. 2. See also Made in the USA I, 56 F. Supp. 2d at
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stitutional constraints, or whether these powers are absolute.6 9
Thus, the plaintiffs argued that the political branches could not
construe their textually committed power as a grant of unfretted authority in breach of constitutional bounds on such
power." In particular, since the Constitution provides for a
treaty-making process in the Treaty Clause, that process must
be followed whenever a treaty is ratified.7 ' The political
branches cannot claim that their constitutionally enumerated
authority with respect to foreign affairs and treaty making allows them to use an alternative means for ratifying treaties in
violation of the Treaty Clause.7 2
The district court, in fact, found the plaintiffs' argument
more persuasive." In spite of the government's attempt to interpret the enumerated powers of the President and Congress
as boundless grants of authority,74 the court characterized the
question as an inquiry into whether the political branches have
'chosen a constitutionally permissible means of implementing
[their enumerated] power."'75 Since the Treaty Clause requires
69. Made in the USA I, 56 F. Supp. 2d at 1257 ("[Pjlaintiffs do not contest
the government's assertion that the political branches have substantial authority over foreign affairs and commerce.").
70. Id. at 1258.
71. Id. at 1278 n.211.
72. Id.
73. See id. at 1276.
74. Id. at 1256 (stating that according to the government, neither the political branches nor the courts have ever recognized limitations on the foreign
commerce power).
75. Made in the USA I, 56 F. Supp. 2d at 1257 (quoting Immigration and
Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 940-41 (1983)) (holding that
although Congress has plenary power to legislate in the area of immigration,
that power was subject to limitations included in the text of the Constitution). Accordingly, the Supreme Court found unconstitutional a statutory
provision that provided for a one-house veto power over executive department
decisions, since such procedure fails to comply with the Presentment Clause's
requirement of bicameral passage by majority vote and presentment to the
President of any act deemed legislative. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 956-58. Furthermore, the judicial branch must determine whether a congressional act
violates the Constitution. See Made in the USA I, 56 F. Supp. 2d at 1276-78
(court is particularly persuaded by Chadha).
The court also found Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969) persuasive on the textually committed prong of the political question inquiry. In
Powell, the Supreme Court found that Article I, section 5 represents a textually demonstrable commitment to Congress to judge the qualifications of its
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a specific process for ratifying treaties, the political branches
cannot have the discretion as to what procedure to use, for that
would render the constitutional provision a dead letter. 6 Furthermore, if the courts can determine the constitutionality of
substantive provision of a treaty, they should be entitled to determine the constitutionality of the procedures used to adopt
such treaties.7 7 Obviously, where the Constitution mandates a
given procedure for the exercise of a given power, the judiciary,
in its role as sole and supreme interpreter of its provisions,
must assure that the political branches adhere to such mandate. 8

b. Judicial Standards
The government also argued that standards are lacking for a
judicial decision as to whether a particular international
agreement's approval must comply with the Treaty Clause procedure. 9 This argument centers upon the constitutional text i.e., the word "treaties" in the Treaty Clause as well as the
Compacts Clause." The government contended that because
Members, and is therefore not subject to judicial review. However, such decisions are limited to the express qualifications outlined in the Constitution i.e., age and citizenship. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2. Thus, were Congress to decide upon qualifications that are not included in the text, such
decision would certainly be subject to judicial review. Otherwise, Congress'
power would amount to an effective nullification of the Constitution's requirement of a two-thirds majority vote for expulsion under Article I, section
5, clause 2, since Congress would be able to affect a Member's expulsion under the pretense of judging the Member's qualifications. See Powell, 395 U.S.
at 547-48; Made in the USA I, 56 F. Supp. 2d at 1278 n.211 (explaining that
this case is similar to Powell with respect to the possibly of nullifying the
Treaty Clause, if it is determined that the Clause's procedures are exclusive).
76. See Made in the USA I, 56 F. Supp. 2d at 1278 n.211.
77. Id. at 1256, 1278, citing Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 14, 17 (1957) (recognizing that foreign commitments cannot relieve the government from its
obligation to operate within the limits imposed by the Constitution, and that
the prohibitions of the Constitution cannot be nullified by the President or by
the President and the Senate combined).
78. See Made in the USA 1, 56 F. Supp. 2d at 1276 n.210; Michael J. Glannon, Foreign Affairs and the Political Question Doctrine, 83 AM. J. INT'L L.
814, 820 (1989) (arguing that judicial nonintervention in foreign-affairs disputes between Congress and the President poses a fimdamental threat to the
separation of powers).
79. See Made in the USA I, 56 F. Supp. 2d at 1258.
80. Id. at 1260.
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the term "treaties" is undefined in the text, and because the
text fails to delineate between treaties and the other international agreements it mentions, there can be no applicable standards to resolve this case, in which the pivotal question is
whether the agreement is, or is not, a treaty.8 Further, the
Constitution does not address the procedures for adopting
agreements that are not treaties, and does not explicitly mandate that treaties are the exclusive means of making agreements between the federal government and foreign powers or
that the Treaty Clause procedure is the exclusive method of
ratifying treaties.82 Thus, the lack of definition as well as the
silence on the exclusivity and alternatives with respect to the
making of international agreements suggests that there can be
no legal standards dealing with the process of adopting such
agreements.
Judicial precedent, according to government, supports the
corollary that a lack of specificity within the constitutional text
results in a lack of judicially manageable standards." For example, a plurality of the Supreme Court held that a congressional challenge of the President's unilateral termination of a
treaty was nonjusticiable because the Constitution fails to provide guidance on the issue.' Thus, the opinion contrasted the
making of a treaty with the abrogation of a treaty. While the
process for the former is clearly outlined in the Treaty Clause,
no mention is made of the process for the latter. The opinion
therefore concluded that no standards exist for a judicial determination of what is the proper procedure for the termination
of a treaty."5 Similarly, the Supreme Court found that a claim
challenging Congress' impeachment procedures was not justiciable since the Impeachment Clause" fails to identify the
proper process by which to try impeachments." The absence of
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. See Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 1003 (1979) (Rehnquist, J.,
concurring).
85. Id. Justice Rehnquist also noted that, in addition to the absence of
any constitutional provision governing the termination a treaty, different
termination procedures may be appropriate for different treaties. Id.
86. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6.
87. See Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 236-38 (1993).

2002]

MADE IN THE USA FOUNDATION

1043

a textually mandated impeachment process, and the lack of
any textual limits upon the legislative branch's discretion in
dictating impeachment procedures, deprives the judiciary of
the standards necessary for determining the constitutionality
Other than stating the undefined term
of such process."
"treaty," the Treaty Clause similarly fails to outline under
which circumstances its procedure must be followed, the government argued. 9 Consequently, the present case was nonjusticiable due to the lack ofjudicially manageable standards.
The plaintiffs countered that the lack of a definition for the
term "treaty" within the Constitution's text cannot confer upon
the political branches unfretted discretion to determine
whether a particular agreement constitutes a treaty requiring
the Treaty Clause's procedure for its adoption. 0 Supreme
Court precedence, according to plaintiffs, consistently adjudicated claims that called for the interpretation of provisions in
which the Constitution failed to provide clear guidance. 1 For
example, the Court ruled on the applicability of the Presentment Clause92 to congressional action, in spite of the Constitution's failure to specify exactly what constitutes legislative action requiring adherence to the bicameralism and presentment
requirements.93 Similarly, although the Origination Clause94
provides no definition or guidance as to what kind of bill
amounts to a "bill for raising revenue," the Court ruled on the

88. Id. The Court distinguished Nixon from Powell in which it held that
the judiciary may review the House of Representative's finding as to a Member's qualification. The contrast between Nixon and Powell is evident in the
constitutional constraints, which are absent in the former but present in the
latter. Whereas the Constitution makes no mention whatsoever of the process by which the Senate is to try impeachments, it specifically addresses
House membership qualification - i.e., the age, citizenship and residency
requirements of Article I, section 2, clause 2. Consequently, the House's authority to judge the qualifications of its own Members under Article I, section
5, clause 1 is textually limited to those qualifications of section 2, clause 2.
See Made in the USA I, 56 F. Supp. 2d at 1260.
89. Made in the USA I, 56 F. Supp. 2d at 1261.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
93. See Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919,

981 (1983).
94. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 7, cl. 1.
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merits of the claim." In rejecting the contention that a lack of
clear guidance in the text suggests a lack of judicial standards,
the Court listed the many provisions in Constitution whose
interpretation required the judiciary to develop legal standards
in the absence of textually defined standards.96 Finally, the
Court was able to determine whether an official falls within the
meaning of the term "inferior officer" of the Appointment
Clause, 7 even though the "line between 'inferior' and 'principal'
officers is one that is far from clear, and the Framers provided
little guidance as to where it should be drawn."9"
The plaintiffs also contended that the cases cited by the government are inapposite to the present case. First, Goldwater
involves the termination of a treaty as opposed to its adoption,
and, as previously pointed out, the Constitution only mandates
a process for adopting a treaty but is entirely silent as to the
process for termination of a treaty.99 Moreover, even with respect to the termination of a treaty, only four justices expressly
agreed that the issue presents a nonjusticiable political question.1" Second, the Impeachment Clause at issue in Nixon v.
United States"' explicitly provides that the "Senate shall have
the sole power to try all Impeachments."'' 2 Thus, the Constitu95. See United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385, 395-96 (1990).
96. The Supreme Court stated:
To be sure, the courts must develop stafidards for making [such] determinations, but the [g]ovrenment suggests no reason that developing such standards will be more difficult in this context than in any
other. Surely a judicial system capable of determining when punishment is "cruel and unusual," when bail is "[e]xcessive," when
searches are "unreasonable, " and when congressional action is "necessary and proper" for executing an enumerated power is capable of
making the more prosaic judgments demanded by adjudication of
Origination Clause challenges.

Id.
97. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
98. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 671 (1988).
99. See Made in the USA I, 56 F. Supp. 2d 1226, 1262 n.144 (N.D. Ala.
1999), citing Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 1003 (1979) (Rehnquist, J.,
concurring).
100. Made in the USA I, 56 F. Supp. 2d at 1262.
101. Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224 (1993).
102. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6. See also Made in the USA I, 56 F. Supp.
2d at 1262. The plaintiffs pointed out that the reason for finding the question
nonjusticiable was not that the Supreme Court found the Impeachment
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tion vested the power of determining the process of such trial
solely in the Senate, and as a consequence, a challenge
of the
10 3
justiciable.
be
cannot
process
such
of
constitutionality
The district court found plaintiffs' argument more persuasive, holding that the question of whether a particular agreement amounts to a treaty and whether the Treaty Clause's procedure is the exclusive means of adopting such a treaty are legal issues subject to judicial review and interpretation.' °4 That
the constitutional provision at issue is undefined is no deterrent against judicial review, for it is standard judicial practice
Clause ambiguous with regard to the meaning of the term "try." Rather, the
plaintiffi argued, based on pages 229-36 of the Nixon decision, that the Court
concluded that the question of the trial's procedures is nonjusticiable because
it found that the Framers made a considered judgment to vest in the Senate
the sole power to try impeachments. See id. This result is buttressed by the
fact that the Clause contains three express procedural safeguards; i.e., that
the Senators be under oath, that two-thirds of the Senate vote to convict and
that the Chief Justice preside over any impeachment of the President. See
id. Thus, should a claim be made that the Senate did not adhere to these
express provisions - i.e., in direct analogy to the claim here - the Court
would not be hesitant about whether to adjudicate the question. See, e.g.,
Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 548-49 (1969) (refusing to permit the
House to "exclude" a Member because it did not adhere to the two-thirds requirement of Article I, section 5). See also supranote 75 and discussion.
The plaintiffs further distinguished Nixon from the present case by
pointing out that the Court expressly recognized in Nixon that a finding of
nonjusticiability there would not permit the Senate to defeat any separate
provision of the Constitution. See Made in the USA I, 56 F. Supp. 2d at 1262;
Nixon, 506 U.S. at 237. Conversely, as in Powell, a finding of nonjusticiability there in the present case would render the Treaty Clause void, for the
court would never be able to reach the merits of a constitutional challenge
based upon the Clause.
The government responded by pointing out that Powell as well as
Chadha involved situations where the claim was that Congress arguably
transgressed specific textual limits. See Powell, 395 U.S. at 521; Immigration
and Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 942 (1983). Conversely, in
the present case, Congress' authority is grounded upon the Foreign Commerce Clause, which is not subject to any limitation - unlike the Impeachment Clause and the Qualifications Clause. See Made in the USA I, 56 F.
Supp. 2d at 1262 n.143. However, this argument is flawed. For while the
Foreign Commerce Clause contains no limitations per se, construing the
powers under it as grants of unbridled powers - i.e., immunizing them from
judicial review - would defeat a separate provision of the Constitution, as it
would effectively render the Treaty Clause a dead letter.
103. See Made in the USA I, 56 F. Supp. 2d at 1262.
104. Id. at 1276-78.
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to interpret vague constitutional texts."5 In fact, that is the
essence of the judicial function - announcement of the law,
whether by interpreting ambiguous or vague texts or otherwise."' Further, the court concluded that judicially discoverable and manageable standards do exist to determine these
issues. '
c. Prudential Considerations
The government's argument with respect to the prudential
concerns prong of the political question doctrine entails a multithreaded analysis. In all, the government identified four distinct factors in the present case that ought to counsel against
the suitability of judicially reviewing the controversy here.'
They are: (1) the necessity of federal uniformity; (2) the potential effect of an adverse judicial decision on the nation's economy and foreign relations; (3) the reliance of governments and
businesses on the positive aspects of NAFTA; and (4) the respect courts should pay to coordinate branches of the federal
government.o9
The Supreme Court recognized that in the area of foreign affairs, it is important for the branches of the federal government
to speak with one voice."0 Further, the Court observed that
"federal uniformity is essential" in the area of foreign commerce."' According to the government, a judicial decision invalidating NAFTA on constitutional grounds would clearly disturb this principle of federal uniformity in the area of foreign
commerce." 2 The plaintiffs countered, however, that in spite of
the legitimate interest of having the government speak with
105. Id.
106. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) (the implication
of "interpreting the law" is the need for clarification of otherwise vague or
ambiguous terms).
107. Made in the USA I, 56 F. Supp. 2d at 1276-78 (The court stated, "All
these issues involve constitutional interpretation just as do issues involving
the intent and scope of the First, Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, etc.
The difficulty of decision does not change the nature of the issue.").
108. Id. at 1266.
109. Id.
110. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962).
111. Made in the USA I, 56 F. Supp. 2d at 1267 (quoting Japan Line, Ltd. v.
County of Los Angeles, 444 U.S. 434, 448 (1979)).
112. See Made in the USA 1, 56 F. Supp. 2d at 1267.
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one voice, that concern cannot dictate the Treaty Clause analysis because the Clause specifically requires two distinct voices
i.e., the Senate's and the President's."' Moreover, if those
voices authorized in the Constitution are not all heard, because
the mandated procedure was not followed, then the govern-

ment in fact speaks with less than its full voice."
The government further contended that a judicial declaration

that NAFTA is unconstitutional would undermine every other
major international trade agreement made in the past twenty
to thirty years.'
Consequently, it would deal a profound setback for the nation's economic growth and its ability to deal
with foreign powers." 6 Moreover, because the governments,
businesses and citizens of the U. S., Mexico and Canada have
conducted their business affairs in reliance on the benefits of
NAFTA, an adverse ruling would have a destabilizing effect in
all three countries."17 Therefore, the circumstances demonstrate "an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made.""8
Finally, the government argued, judicial review of the process by which the political branches enter into international
agreements would violate the respect due coordinate branches
113. See id. Arguably, the Treaty Clause's requirement of the two voices is
consistent with the one-voice theory because the Clause's requirements are
specifically for, and hence before, the adoption of treaties. Thus, when its
procedures are followed and a treaty is adopted thereby, it is then that the
government's voice first speaks as such, and by then it is with one voice, as
opposed to, for example, during deliberations before the adoption.
114. See id. Evidently, less than a full voice is just as damaging than multifarious voices, the former suggesting instability and disorder in government, and the latter indicating a less than full democratic process.
115. Id. at 1268-67. Moreover:
[Tihe President stated that "[clooperation between the administration and Congress on a bipartisan basis has been critical in our efforts to reduce the deficit, to conclude trade agreements that level
the global level playing field for America, to secure peace and prosperity along America's borders and to help prepare all Americans to
benefit from expanded economic opportunities."
Id. at 1268 (quoting President's Message to Congress Transmitting the Study
on the Operation and Effect of the North America Free Trade Agreement, 33
WEEKLY CoMP. PRES. Doc. 1054 (July 11, 1997)).
116. See id.
117. See Made in the USA I, 56 F. Supp. 2d at 1268.
118. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
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of government."9 This proposition is supported by the two concurring opinions in Goldwater, which held that the judiciary
should not decide the constitutionality of the approval process
of an agreement where the political branches cooperated to
conclude such an agreement. 2 ' Since the Senate has not insisted on its alleged right to approve NAFTA in accordance
with the Treaty Clause, the court should defer to the decisions
of the coordinate branches of government. 12' The plaintiffs refuted this argument by simply stating that under our system of
government, federal courts will occasionally "interpret the Constitution in a manner" that is inconsistent with the actions of
the political branches.122 Such conflict "cannot 123justify the
courts' avoiding their constitutional responsibility."
The district court accepted the plaintiffs' response on this issue, holding that respect for coordinate branches is no more an
issue than it is in many other contexts. 124 Furthermore, the
court found that there is no unusual need for unquestioning
119. See Made in the USA I, 56 F. Supp. 2d at 1268.
120. See Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 997 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring). Similarly, Justice Rehnquist stated that the judicial branch should not
decide issues affecting the allocation of power between the President and
Congress until the political branches reach an impasse. Id. at 1005 n.1.
121. See Made in the USA 1, 56 F. Supp. 2d at 1268. The government further cited Justice Powell's concurrence in Goldwater for the proposition that
when the Senate sees no reason to contest the President's decision to submit
an agreement to the whole Congress, it is not the court's "task to do so."
Goldwater, 444 U.S. at 995 (Powell, J., concurring).
The plaintiffs point out, however, that this argument is unsound.
Assuming, arguendo, that the constitutional requirement of a supermajority
was intentionally crafted to protect minority interests, there is no reason to
expect that the majority of Congress or the President would raise objections
to the elimination of such protection. Therefore, the fact that Congress and
the President have mutually agreed to implement the fast-track procedure
and ignore the Treaty Clause's requirements does not legitimize the practice.
On the contrary, it illustrates why the Clause's protections were needed in
the first place - i.e., to avoid (simple) majority control over the creation of
treaties. See Made in the USA I, 56 F. Supp. 2d at 1269. Support for this
supposition regarding the Framers' intent for requiring the supermajority is
a matter to be argued on the merits. For the extensive treatment of the intent/history of the Treaty Clause in the district court's opinion, see id. at
1300-32.
122. Made in the USA I, 56 F. Supp. 2d at 1269 (citing Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 548 (1969)).
123. Powell, 395 U.S. at 548.
124. Made in the USA I, 56 F. Supp. 2d at 1278.
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adherence to political decisions, which arguably violate the
Constitution, and that there has been no specific announcement' by the political branches related to the application of
the Treaty Clause, which might cause embarrassment. 1 6 Fi-

nally, the court boldly stated that it could not perceive of any
prudential considerations that might caution against judicial
intervention.2 7
2. The Eleventh Circuit's Decision
As indicated, the circuit court reversed the district court's
holding with respect to the justiciability issue." Finding that
the case presents a nonjusticiable political question, the circuit
court dismissed the complaint." Remarkably, the court found
each of the Goldwater factors cutting in the government's favor
- i.e., favoring preclusion of the case from judicial review due
to the political nature of the issues involved.13 The court underscored that the elements of the Baker/Goldwater framework are disjunctive and therefore finding even one element
applicable in a particular case may suffice to render that case
nonjusticiable. Nevertheless, it proceeded to analyze and conall such factors point toward a finding of nonjusticlude that
3
ciability.1 1
The circuit court's analysis, however, is less persuasive than
32
that of the district court, and not merely because it is shorter.
125. With respect to the multifarious-voices thread of the prudentialconsiderations prong, the government's contention was that the mere adoption of NAFTA in the challenged manner entails an effective announcement
by the political branches that its adoption was constitutional. Arguably, this
is the common understanding of the multifarious-voices analysis and the
more plausible one. It would be odd to insist that "unquestioning adherence"
to avoid embarrassing the political branches is only applicable when such
branches enunciated Constitutional holdings. Quite to the contrary, due
respect to the coordinate branches is properly invoked only in the case of
these branches'policy determination. See id. at n.210.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Made in the USA II, 242 F.3d 1300, 1302 (11th Cir. 2001).
129. Id.
130. Id. at 1312 (citing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962)).
131. Made in the USA II, 242 F.3d at 1312-18.
132. While the district court's opinion is remarkably long, at almost 100
pages, the circuit court's is less than twenty. But, of course, mere length
cannot have a bearing on the quality of the analysis, for indeed, "brevity is
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Conceivably, though, the circuit court's decision might be justified as being result-oriented, motivated by the prudential concerns discussed in its justiciability analysis.13 Nevertheless, it
would seem more principled to assert the judiciary's role,
rather than practice restraint - particularly where, as here,
choosing the former path would not affect the outcome.134 What
follows is a discussion of the court's analysis and a critique of
its reasoning with respect to each of the Goldwater factors.
III. THE CIRCUIT COURT'S BAKER ANALYSIS

A. Textual Commitment
The circuit court concluded that the Constitution's text committed to the political branches the discretion to choose which
procedures to employ for the adoption of any given international, commercial agreement. 13 Consequently, in the case of
such an agreement, the constitutionality of the adapting procedures is a nonjusticiable issue. In support for this holding, the
court used a bifurcated approach. First, the court recited the
constitutional provisions 13 6 that indicate broad grants of authe soul of wit." WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET, PRINCE OF DENMARK, act 2,
sc. 2. Furthermore, the lower court intentionally created an extensive record
to assist the reviewing courts. See discussion supra note 40. Despite its
length, and thoroughness, moreover, one commentator characterized the
district court's opinion as "long but hesitant." District Court Holds that
NAFTA is a Valid Exercise, supra note 40, at 1235. See also Alan S. Lederman, Eleventh Circuit Declines to Rewrite 20th Century World History, 75
FLA. B.J. 30, 34 (2001) (The district court's "rather weakly justified concluding passages leave much to be desired.").
133. See Made in the USA II, 242 F.3d at 1317-19. See generally FRANCK,
supra note 19; Lederman, supra note 132, at 36 (conceding that the circuit
court's approach is technically dubious, but defending it as preferable to the
district court's heavily criticized ruling on the merits).
134. See generally FRANCK, supra note 19; ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE
LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS
(1962); but cf. HENRY M. HART, JR. & HERBERT WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM (1953); Martin H. Redish, JudicialReview

and the "PoliticalQuestion," 79 Nw. U. L. REV. 1031 (1984). See also commentators cited supra notes 16-18.
135. Made in the USA 11, 242 F.3d at 1311.
136. These powers include the President's role as Chief Executive under
Article II, section 1, clause 1, and as Commander in Chief, under Article III,
section 2, clause 1. Additionally, the President has the power to "make Treaties," albeit only with the advice and consent of two-thirds of the Senate, as
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thority to the political branches in the areas of foreign affairs
and foreign commerce.13 Next, the court reasoned that as a
consequence of these textually enumerated p6wers, the political branches' actions in the sphere of foreign affairs must necessarily be protected from judicial review.13 8 This two-step
analysis is essential because the mere granting of particular
functions, powers and authorities to governmental branches
cannot be tantamount to the granting of unfretted discretion to
those branches in the exercise of such functions, powers and
authorities, especially when the Constitution itself mandates
compliance with specific procedure with respect to such function, powers and authorities.13 9 Thus, simply because the political branches are textually granted vast powers in regards to
foreign affairs, it cannot mean that they can ignore the constitutional requirement of a supermajority of the Senate for
adopting treaties. "
Apparently, realizing this weakness in its analysis, the circuit court resorted to a plethora of Supreme Court precedents
well as "appoint Ambassadors ... and Consuls," under Article II, section 2,
clause 2, and receive "Ambassadors and other public Ministers," under Article H, section 3. See supratext accompanying notes 60-72.
In a similar vein, the court listed the constitutional provisions that confer
analogous powers to Congress in the area of foreign affairs, inchiding the
power "to declare war," under Article I, section 8, clause 11; "to raise armies,"
under clause 12; and "to provide and maintain a navy," under clause 13. And
with regard to its foreign commerce powers, the court added that it is "most
significantf" that the Constitution also confers on the entire Congress - not
just the Senate, as in the case of treaty ratification - the authority "to regulate commerce with foreign nations," under clause 3.
137. Made in the USA II, 242 F.3d at 1313-14.
138. Id.
139. This proposition is so axiomatic as to obviate the need for citations.
But as eminent an authority as Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137
(1803), should suffice for supporting it. After all, it is the Executive's function to execute the laws that Congress, functioning as Legislature, has enacted. It would be perverse in the extreme to argue that by virtue of the textually enumerated functions of these branches, they should have unreviewable discretion in performing them, even in contravention of express constitutional provisions. See, e.g., Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha,
462 U.S. 919, 940-41 (1983) (Regardless of a branch's plenary power over a
particular subject matter, the Court has final reviewing authority to determine whether that branch "has chosen a constitutionally permissible means
of implementing that power.").
140. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
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that indicate that the political branches' powers in the realm of
foreign affairs are uniquely broad-based and exclusive.'
And
as a consequence, in matters relating to foreign affairs, the political branches' discretion is "'largely immune from judicial
inquiry or interference.'"' 4 2 The court thus suggested that these
cases serve to bridge the gap between the textual grants of
power and the purported corollary that the exercise of such
power is unreviewable. However, for a variety of reasons, this
conclusion is tenuous at best.
First, the Supreme Court merely spoke with respect to policy
decisions by the political branches.'
Thus, by virtue of the
Constitution's grants of broad and exclusive authorities in the
area of foreign relations to the political branches, the judiciary
is precluded from adjudging the wisdom of policies adopted by
those branches in those areas. However, from the broad protections afforded the political branches' policy decisions, it does
not necessarily follow that their methods in adopting or executing such policies are likewise absolutely protected.'" Rather,
where such methods are challenged as being in violation of express constitutional requirements, it45is the "duty of the judicial
department to say what the law is."'

141. See, e.g., Ludeck v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 160, 173 (1948) (stating that
President is the nation's "guiding organ" in foreign affairs); Dep't of Navy v.
Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 529 (1988) (stating that foreign policy is the province of
the Executive); United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304,
318 (1936) (stating that political branches have power to conclude agreements that are not treaties in the constitutional sense).
142. Made in the USA II, 242 F.3d at 1314 (quoting Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S.
280, 292 (1981)).
143. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962) (making reference to "initial policy determinations").
144. In this sense, the Supreme Court's precedent does not illuminate the
original difficulty in the circuit court's reasoning, i.e., that a mere grant of
textual powers does not necessarily equal immunity from judicial review. For
the Court's holdings with regard to the broad scope of the policy powers of the
political branches in the arena of foreign affairs only establishes that the
subject matter is unique and that for a number of understandable justifications, the political branches must be allowed some leeway, which may not be
available in the context of domestic affairs. However, that still says nothing
about the political branches' ability to violate the Constitution under the
guise of their admitted textually-granted broad-based foreign affairs powers.
145. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
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Second, in many of the cases relied upon by the circuit court,
the Supreme Court simply addressed itself to the practical rationales underlying the Constitution's grant of such vast powers to the political branches. Thus, the Court recognized that
the President is the nation's "guiding organ in the conduct of
our foreign affairs," in whom the Constitution vests "vast
powers in relation to the outside world," "7 due to obvious practical concerns.'48 Therefore, whil6 these concerns are valid, it is
rather far fetched to suggest that such concerns amount to a
textual commitment per se. Instead, the opposite is true. For,
while it is possible to explain a clearly demonstrable textual
commitment to a political branch as stemming from a prudential concern, such a concern cannot by itself indicate a textual
grant of unreviewable power to such branches.' 9
Finally, the Supreme Court itself, apparently recognizing the
pitfalls potentially arising from extending the political
branches' foreign affairs powers to far, admonished in Baker
that it would be "error to suppose that every case or controversy which touches foreign relations lies beyond judicial cognizance.""O The Court also expressly held that the existence of
"foreign commitments" could not relieve the government of its
obligation to "operate within the bounds laid down by the Constitution."51 Consequently, the Supreme Court's opinions cited
by the circuit court are unhelpful for the proposition that because the issue in this case involves foreign relations, it is
thereby rendered nonjusticiable. Acknowledging that much,
the circuit court stated that it has "little doubt" that courts
have a duty to adjudicate such issues. 52
Nevertheless, the court insisted that this case is nonjusticiaThus, beble for it also involves a commercial agreement.'
146. Ludeck, 335 U.S. at 173.
147. Id.
148. See Baker, 369 U.S. at 211; Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles,
444 U.S. 434, 448 (1979); Michelin Tire Corp. v. Comm'r,.423 U.S. 276, 285
(1976).
149. See, e.g., Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 1003 (1979) (Rehnquist,
J., concurring).

150. Baker, 369 U.S. at 211.
151. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 14, 17 (1957).
152. Made in the USA II, 242 F.3d 1300, 1314 (11th Cir. 2001).
153. Id.
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cause it is not merely a foreign affairs matter, but also a commercial matter, the Constitution's demonstrable assignment of
authority to the political branches over the nation's foreign affairs and commerce"' must counsel against the judiciary's intruding role in overseeing the President and Congress in such
matters.'55 However, the court fails to explain why commercial
matters - or even commercial and foreign affairs matters in
combination - deserve more -deference than mere foreign affairs matters. Therefore, if, as the Supreme Court cautioned,
in exercising its foreign affairs powers, the government cannot
relieve itself from abiding by constitutional limits, 5 6 the same
must be true of the political branches' commercial, or commercial and foreign affairs when combined, powers. Consequently,
the constitutionality of the adoption procedures of an international agreement, even a commercial one, is matter properly
within the judicial purview.
B. JudiciallyManageableStandards
The district court also found that no judicially manageable
standards exist for determining whether a given international,
commercial agreement constitutes a treaty to require approval
pursuant to the Treaty Clause's procedure.5 7 Therefore, the
constitutional challenge upon NAFTA's adoption procedures
presents a nonjusticiable political question. Mustering support
for its holding, the court relied heavily on Goldwater, where a
plurality of the Supreme Court held that judicial standards are
absent to decide what procedures must be followed for the abThe court seemed to have seized on the
rogation of a treaty.'
plurality's explanation that in the absence of constitutionally
mandated procedures, the process must be governed by political standards.5 9 Accordingly, in the present case, since there
are no legal standards to decide when an agreement must com154. That is, the President's foreign affairs powers and the Congress' roles
and powers in foreign affairs matters as well as its foreign commerce power.
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
155. See Made in the USA 1I, 242 F.3d at 1314.
156. See Reid, 354 U.S. at 14, 17.
157. See Made in the USA 1I, 242 F.3d at 1314.
158. See Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 1003 (1979) (Rehnquist, J.,
concurring).
159. Id.

2002]

MADE IN THE USA FOUNDATION

1055

ply with the Treaty Clause, the process is likewise to be governed by the political branches.160
The present case, however, is distinguishable form Goldwater in one important respect. Namely, here the Constitution
clearly mandates a process for the adoption of a Treaty,
whereas it is completely silent concerning the abrogation of a
Treaty. 6 ' Indeed, the Supreme Court plurality opinion in
Goldwater stresses this distinction as support for its reasoning
that the latter issue, as apparently contrasted from the former,
presents a nonjusticiable question.'62 To overcome this difficulty, the circuit court, while acknowledging that Goldwater
may not be controlling here, maintains that it is nevertheless
instructive to the present case because the constitutional provision at issue here

-

i.e., the Treaty Clause

-

fails to "provide

an identifiable
" textual limit on the authority granted by the

Constitution. "

The circuit court thus reasoned that because the Constitution
does not explicitly state at which point, or what factors to consider in determining whether an agreement has risen to the
level of a "treaty"'6 - requiring adherence to the Treaty
Clause's procedure - such question is nonjusticiable due to the
lack of judicial standards.'65 Effectively, the court equates an
undefined term in the Constitution - i.e., "Treaty" - with
complete silence, as in the abrogation context, suggesting that
in both scenarios the courts lack the necessary yardstick to re160. See Made in the USA II, 242 F.3d at 1315.
161. See Goldwater,444 U.S. at 1003.
162. Id. This may perhaps imply that a constitutional challenge, as here, of
the procedures employed in adopting a treaty is, conversely, indeed justiciable.
163. Made in the USA II, 242 F.3d at 1315.
164. Because the Constitution uses different types of international arrangements, such as "agreements and compacts," in the Compacts Clause,
Article I, section 10, clause 3, and I"Treaties" in the Treaty Clause, Article II,
section 2, clause 2, and makes only the latter subject to stricter adoption requirements, the difference between such arrangements must presumably be
one of degree. Thus, treaties are agreements of more significance than the
other types of international arrangements. See id. at 1315-16. Although the
circuit court rejects the possibility of judicially determining the line between
such arrangements that are agreements or compacts and those that are treaties, it implicitly accepts the distinction to be one of degree.
165. Id.
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solve the legal issues presented, and both are therefore nonjusticiable questions.'66
This analysis, however, flies in the face of a myriad of Supreme Court decisions construing and developing necessary
standards for undefined terms, as the Constitution is replete
with such terms. Likewise, unfazed by a lack of textually identifiable limits, the Court consistently decided issues of scope
and identified limits impacting constitutional provisions, e.g.,
when punishment is "cruel and unusual,"6 ' when bail is
"[elxcessive,"' 68 when searches and seizures are "unreasonable, " 169 and when congressional action is "necessary and
proper."7 ' Indeed, the Supreme Court instructed the courts to
develop standards for making such determinations. 7 ' Consequently, although drawing the line between international
agreements that require Senate ratification and those that do
not may admittedly be difficult," 2 the courts cannot shy away,

166. Id. Apparently, the court recognized the flaw in this analogy; therefore, it attempted to draw an analogy between the silence with respect to the
abrogation of treaties and the silence with regard to the adoption of approving international commercial agreements - i.e., those agreements not rising
to the level of a "Treaty" within the meaning of the Treaty Clause. See id.
However, this observation is hardly helpful, for it would still require courts to
distinguish between a treaty and a non-treaty. The former would require
approval by vote of two-thirds of the Senate, pursuant to the Treaty Clause,
while the latter sufficing a simple legislative majority. Moreover, by virtue of
the Constitution's use of different terms in, e.g., the Compact Clause and the
Treaty Clause, and providing for different treatments for each type of agreement, the distinction must be judicially discoverable - as it is a legal matter
because it involves textual interpretation.
167. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
168. Id.
169. Id. at amend. IV.
170. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. See also United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S.
385, 395-96 (1990); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 671 (1988) (decided line
between "inferior" and "principal officer" for Article II, section 2, clause 2
purposes); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (formulating the "one person, one vote" standard, and as a consequence the Court found gerrymandering to be a justiciable issue in Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 (1986)).
171. See Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S at 395-96.
172. See Made in the USA II, 242 F.3d 1300, 1316 (11th Cir. 2001).
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under the guise of nonjusticiability, from performing its duty of
judicial review, even if it entails developing new standards. 7 3
The circuit court rebuffed this well-established line of Supreme Court jurisprudence by simply noting that in all cases in
which the Court interpreted textual provisions, defined ambiguous terms, established standards and demarcated constitutional limits, the issues did not involve foreign affairs.' 4 Accordingly, the court reasoned, in the foreign affairs sphere, the
judiciary is somehow less capable of making the same kind of
decisions it is capable of making, and indeed has the duty to
make, in numerous other areas. The court, however, offers no
persuasive support for this novel and tenuous exception to the
judiciary's role in interpreting texts and enunciating legal
standards. Instead, it refers to the other two Goldwater factors, claiming that the "textual commitment of such matters to
the political branches," as well as "prudential considerations"
in the area of political and foreign relations counsels strongly
in favor of judicial noninterference.'75
Perhaps even more misguided is the circuit court's statement
that a judicial determination of an international agreement's
significance, which is the essential determinant in deciding
whether such an agreement's adoption requires compliance
with the Treaty Clause's procedure,' 6 would amount to the
court getting involved in policy making. 77 The court, however,
fails to explain why adjudicating the degree, or defining the
limit, of a constitutional term amounts to making policy rather
than announcing the law. In fact, the Supreme Court itself has
declined to follow such path. Thus, while noting the difficulty
of determining the Framers' intent with respect to their use of
the term "treaty"7 ' versus the term "compact," 79 the Court nev173. See Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S at 395-96; Morrison, 487 U.S. at 671; Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 942 (1983);
Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 548-49 (1969).
174. See Made in the USA II, 242 F.3d at 1317.
175. Id.
176. See discussion supra notes 164, 166.
177. See Made in the USA II, 242 F.3d at 1317.
178. See U.S. CoNsT. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (the "Treaty Clause"); id. art. I, § 10,
cl. 3 (the "Compacts Clause"); id. art. III, § 2 (the "Cases-and-Controversies
Clause"); id. art. VI, cl. 2. (the "Supremacy Clause").
179. Id. art. I, § 10, cl. 3 (the "Compacts Clause").
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ertheless proceeded to develop a workable approach to resolve
issues implicating such questions.'
C. PrudentialConsiderations
The circuit court also held that due to prudential considerations, the case at bar is nonjusticiable.18 ' Primarily, the court
emphasized two such factors. First, a judicial declaration invalidating NAFTA on constitutional grounds at this point
would lead to embarrassment of the government from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question. 8 Such divergent positions by coordinate branches of the
government would have a profoundly negative effect on the nation's economy and foreign relations, as myriad parties have
relied on the beneficial changes enshrined in the NAFTA regime. 18 3 Second, a judicial review of the process by which the
President and Congress enter into international agreements
would lead to an intrusion upon the respect due coordinate
branches of government." Such an intrusion, according to the
court's reasoning, is warranted only when the political
branches have reached an impasse. 85 Thus, in the present case,
since the Senate has not asserted its sole prerogative to ratify
180. See U.S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm'n, 434 U.S. 452, 461-63
(1978); Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 540, 563-73 (1840); Holden v.
Joy, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 211, 242-43 (1872) (delineating the scope of the Treaty
Clause); Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25 (1982); B. Altman & Co. v. United
States, 224 U.S. 583 (1912) (construing the term "treaty" in a statute).
181. Made in the USA II, 242 F.3d at 1319.
182. See id.
183. Id. at 1318. The circuit court added ominously that a negative decision on NAFTA's constitutionality "would potentially undermine every other
major international commercial agreement made over the past half-century."
Id. Importantly, however, NAFTA stands out from all those other agreements in that only the former was enacted by less than a two-thirds majority
of the Senate. See Made in the USA I, 56 F. Supp. 2d 1226, 1265 (N.D. Ala.
1999). Thus, while a mere supermajority vote may not equal passage pursuant to the Treaty Clause, the underlying protections of the Clause - i.e.,
affording the dissenting minorities a voice - have been effectuated thereby,
effectively precluding a challenge based such constitutional protections. See
supra note 121 (discussing the minority's protected interest under the Treaty
Clause).
184. Made in the USA II, 242 F.3d at 1318.
185. Id. (citing Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring)).
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NAFTA by a two-thirds majority, the court must demonstrate
greater deference to the decisions of coordinate branches of
government and exercise judicial restraint accordingly.'86
The court's analysis, however, is considerably wanting with
respect to both concerns. Although extraoidinary circumstance
may arise under which there is "an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made,"187 this
case hardly presents such a scenario. Unlike the cases where
the Supreme Court found the need for federal uniformity critical for the national interest, this case does not involve a crisis
comparable to a war declaration'8 or other national emergency.'89 Apparently recognizing this, the circuit court conceded that the case here may not rise to such an urgent situation, yet it suggested that, while perhaps not individually, in
the aggregate, i.e., a judicial decision negatively impacting the
multitude of positions taken in reliance on NAFTA, may indeed
give rise to an emergency-like situation.' However, the court
does not elaborate on this seemingly novel, policy-like determination.
Moreover, respect due the coordinate branches of government
cannot protect such branches from judicial review when their
acts are challenged on grounds that they failed to adhere to
specific constitutional limits on their authority.' The judici186. See Made in the USA II, 242 F.3d at 1319.
187. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
188. Id. at 213 (explaining the Court's refusal to review the political departments' determination of when or whether a war has ended as grounded
on the need for "finality in the political determination, for emergency's nature
demands a 'prompt and unhesitating obedience'") (quoting Martin v. Mot, 25
U.S. (12 Wheat.) 19, 30 (1827) (calling up of militia)).
189. See, e.g., Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981) (upholding the
President's executive orders based upon Congress' implicit ratification of such
authority because the case arose from the seizure of the American Embassy
in Tehran in 1979). In a result-oriented opinion, the Court apparently struggled to legitimize the President's actions. Given the national crisis involved
in Dames & Moore, the Court's desire to legitimize the President's challenged
action is quite understandable. Still, even in view of the urgent nature of the
circumstances, the Court did not purport to defer to the President under the
guise of nonjusticiability.
190. Made in the USA I, 242 F.3d at 1318.
191. See Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 548 (1969) ("Our system of
government requires ... courts on occasion [to] interpret the Constitution in
a manner at variance... [with] another branch.").
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ary's duty to review the political branches' alleged transgressions of its constitutional power is most important in cases,
such as the present one, where the constitutional provision is
intended to afford protection to a minority's interest. 192 Therefore, the Senate majority's acquiescence in the President's act,
by virtue of their vote, should not justify or induce greater
deference to the political branches' choice. Au contraire. A
simple majority's consent to a Treaty's adoption is presumably
precisely the reason the Framers provided the exceptional
supermajority requirement of the Treaty Clause in the first
place. 9 ' Consequently, it would be anomalous to hinge a
decision of judicial review of the Clause's terms upon the very
wrong it was intended to prevent - i.e., the simple majority's
authority to adopt treaties.
Finally, exercising judicial restraint in the present case under the guise of the political question doctrine would result in
rendering the two-thirds requirement of the Treaty Clause a
dead letter. For simply by purporting to enact an "agreement"
as opposed to a "treaty," the President in conjunction with a
congressional majority can circumvent the strictures of the
Treaty Clause, and consequently deprive the minority from an
important constitutional protection. Thus, in the absence of
judicial review of the constitutionality of such act, the Treaty
Clause would in effect become a nullity."M Moreover, as the
Supreme Court has intimated, the political question doctrine
cannot "effectively nullify" constitutional limitations
by grant95
ing the political branches unfretted authority.
192. Axiomatically, the reason for a supermajority requirement is to afford
dissenting minorities added protections. See Made in the USA I, 56 F. Supp.
2d 1226, 1300-32, (N.D. Ala. 1999); see also discussion supranote 121.
193. See Made in the USA I, 56 F. Supp. 2d at 1300-32.
194. In Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 237 (1993), the Court expressly recognized that a nonjusticiability decision cannot allow the political
branches to "defeat" any "separate provision of the Constitution." See also
discussion supra note 102.
195. See Powell, 395 U.S. at 533-37. Accordingly, it is unsurprising that in
the nearly forty years since the Court's seminal formulation of the political
question doctrine in Baker, the Supreme Court has never found an issue nonjusticiable where the claim was based on a "specific constitutional provision
that was fairly subject to a construction under which the challenged governmental action would be seen to be unconstitutional - the situation presented
here." Petitioners' Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 10, Made in the USA II

20021

MADE IN THE USA FOUNDATION

1061

The circuit court's terse retort to this argument proves quite
inadequate. Once more, the court resorts to its suggestion that
Congress' enumerated power to "regulate commerce with foreign nations" somehow immunizes the present challenge from
judicial review. 9 ' However, the court fails to offer an elaborate
rationalization of its holding. Nor does it address the inevitable result of a finding of nonjusticiability in this case, namely
the Treaty Clause's effective nullification.
IV. FOREIGN AFFAIRS UNIQUENESS
The dichotomy between foreign and domestic affairs is deeply
embedded in the roots of American constitutional jurisprudence.'9 7 The principle of judicial abdication with respect to the
President's power in foreign affairs was well established as
early as Marbury v. Madison.'9 Over time, courts have refined
and explained this important exception to the judiciary's role of
adjudicating constitutional controversies.199 Similarly, constitutional and foreign affairs scholars have debated the legitimacy of, and justifications for, such an exception.0 0 More re-

(No. 01-05) (on file with author). The opposite, however, is true - i.e., the
Court relied on a constitutional term to bolster its holding of nonjusticiability
where the challenge was not based upon a constitutional provision. See
Nixon, 506 U.S. at 236-39 (reasoning that the term "try," of Article I, section
3, clause 6, implies a grant of broad, unreviewable power). See also supra
note 102 and accompanying text.
196. Made in the USA II, 242 F.3d 1300, 1319 (11th Cir. 2001). See also
Theresa Wilson, Note, Who Controls International Trade? Congressional
Delegationof the ForeignCommerce Power, 47 DRAKE L. REV. 141, 176 (1998).
197. See generally Louis HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION (2d ed. 1996).

198. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 166 (1803) (stating that
the President's foreign affairs power "can never be examinable by the
courts").
199. See, e.g., Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1 (1831); United States
v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 315-20 (1936) (asserting that
the differences between domestic and foreign affairs is fundamental and tracing the foreign affairs exception to judicial review to a line of British cases);
United States v. Belmont, 304 U.S. 324, 328 (1937) (holding that the political
departments' conduct in the area of foreign relations was not subject to judicial inquiry or decision).
200. See Slaughter Burley, supra note 17, at 1981 ("Among scholars of foreign affairs law... the debate over the political question doctrine is actually
a conflict about whether judicial review should apply to foreign affairs.").
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cently, the debate has engaged the changing landscape of international relations brought about by globalization.
Hence,
the circuit court observed that due to "an increasingly interdependent global economy," various international arrangements
might affect national sovereignty in heretofore-unexpected
ways." 2 Others have criticized the very notion of limiting judicial review of constitutional law at the water's edge.0 3
Professor Thomas Franck presents a persuasive and forceful
argument20 4 against differentiating foreign affairs cases from
their domestic equivalents.2 5 In a democratic system such as
ours, he argues, laws that are not subject to judicial enforcement are not laws at all, and the practice of judicial deference
ignores this evident truth.2 6 Moreover, he cynically explains
the origin of the judiciary's restraint in the foreign relations
sphere as a calculated strategy - a "Faustian pact" - under
which the judiciary throws a relatively inexpensive "giveback"
to the political branches in exchange for the former's exercise of
supremacy in the domestic arena. ' In his chronicle of the de-

201. See generally Curtis A. Bradley, Symposium Overview: A New American ForeignAffairs Law?, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1089 (1999); Note, Restructuring the Modern Treaty Power, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2478 (2001).
202. Made in the USA II, 242 F.3d 1300, 1315 n.33 (11th Cir. 2001). Although the circuit court made this observation in order to prove the lack of
judicially manageable standards, it may actually prove the opposite. Indeed,
because of the pervasiveness of globalization, courts cannot afford to exclude
foreign affairs from its domain - as purely domestic matters are dwindling.
See Slaughter Burley, supra note 17, at 1980 ("There is no longer a clear
division between what is foreign and what is domestic. The world economy,
the world environment, the world AIDS crisis, the world arms race - they
affect us all,'" (quoting The Inauguration:"We Force the Spring;" Transcript
of Address by PresidentClinton, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 1993, at A15)).
203. See FRANCK, supra note 19, at 159.
204. See Carl Landauer, Political Questions/JudicialAnswers: Does the
Rule of Law Apply to ForeignAffairs?, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 465, 466 (1993) (book
review) (Franck's book is a moral, and "at times emotional argument against
the use of the political question doctrine by U.S. courts to abstain from deciding cases that touch upon foreign policy."); Slaughter Burley, supra note 17,
at 1981 (calling Franck's argument "elegant, erudite, and often passionate").
205. See FRANCK, supra note 19, at 8 ("A foreign policy exempt from judicial
review is tantamount to governance by men and women emancipated from
the bounds of law.").
206. Id.
207. Id. at 12.
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velopment of the doctrine, Franck describes how the federal
20 8
judiciary has taken this trade-off as a matter of "orthodoxy."
In spite of this deeply embedded tradition, Franck nonetheless detects the judiciary's ambivalence, which results in a
"powerful whiff of hypocrisy."2 9 Although repeatedly invoking
the doctrine, many courts seem not to have taken its teaching
seriously to heart, for although dutifully referring to the doc210
trine, they will reach a decision on the merits, regardless.
Essentially, Franck sees a judiciary that is result-oriented, intent on conforming to the foreign policy decisions of the executive, whether by adjudicating on the merits or by claiming nonjusticiability in a given case.21' This tendency is most vividly
illustrated in the twin decisions of the district court and the
circuit court in Made in the USA Foundation. Both courts

reached the same ultimate result: validation of the means utilized by the political branches for adopting NAFTA. In the
process of reaching this result, the courts exhibited great deference to the foreign policy decision of the President and the
Congress. The only difference was each respective court's approach. Whereas the district court decided on the merits, the
circuit court chose to decide on the "threshold" matter, and indeed accomplished that, no less, by employing reasoning parallel to the district court's reasoning on the merits.2 However,
the latter's choice may be unjustified as a matter of principle
with respect to the judiciary's role in our system."'
V. CONCLUSION

As demonstrated above, courts can effectively mold the political question doctrine to suit their desired result. Viewed
thus, the doctrine is a mere pretense for the judiciary's politi208. Id. at 30.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Landauer, supranote 204, at 456.
212. See supra notes 11-16 and accompanying text. See also Lederman,
supra note 132, at 36 (arguing that although reaching the same ultimate
"stabilizing result," the circuit court's approach is preferable to that of the
district court's because the former, by not even "calling into question" the
validity of international agreements, "more clearly promotes international

stability").
213. See generally FRANCK, supra note 19; Redish, supra note 134.
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cally motivated abdicationisms.
Nevertheless, the doctrine
does have rather significant justifiable purposes. Hence, even
as staunch a critic as Professor Franck concedes the doctrine's
legitimacy under certain exigent circumstances, such as "in the
midst of military hostilities. '14 However, in Made in USA
Foundation, since it concerns a commercial agreement, such
justification for applying the doctrine seems to be lacking.
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